Report of the International Observer Mission (IOM) for the 2025 Philippine Elections

Read the full report in PDF form here

The 2025 Philippine Midterm Elections have been marred by significant violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), or the rules of war. This is especially true in the impoverished rural communities throughout the Philippine countryside that are plagued by increasing militarization by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), as well as presence of foreign troops including those from the United States. These IHL violations have been well documented under both the Duterte and Marcos Jr regimes, including by the 2024 International People’s Tribunal (IPT) which found both administrations guilty of war crimes against the Filipino people.

The Midterm Elections are unfolding against the backdrop of a decades-long armed conflict between the Government Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and a revolutionary national liberation movement represented by the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP). In response to the revolutionary movement, the GRP engages in violent repression of the Filipino people through “counterterrorism” and “counterinsurgency” campaigns which have led to widespread violations of human rights and IHL. Despite claims by Marcos Jr that the human rights situation has improved following the Duterte regime, militarization and war crimes by the AFP have intensified.

IHL is a set of rules which seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict and to reduce the human suffering caused by it. It requires belligerent forces to make a distinction between combatants and military objects on the one hand, and civilians and civilian objects on the other hand. As stated by Marjorie Cohn, an expert witness during the IPT, “The Philippines’ US-inspired counter-insurgency program does not distinguish between civilians and combatants, which is considered a war crime under the Geneva Conventions”. Under the guise of fighting the armed revolutionary movement, the GRP’s counterinsurgency campaigns have deliberately targeted any and all forms of dissent, including the campaigning of activists and civilian organizations. They are carried out by the various state and state-aligned machineries including the AFP, Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and various other militia and vigilante groups.

These campaigns have received the cooperation and support of the United States Government through military aid, training, weapons and deployment of US troops to military bases in the Philippines. Ahead of the 2025 Midterm Elections, the US State Department approved two arms sales to the Philippine Government for $336 million in February, and $120 million in April.

The 2022 International Observers Mission (IOM) documented instances of election-related violations of IHL against civilians, including political killings, shootings, abductions, political arrests and detention, harassment and surveillance of candidates and supporters, and red-tagging. These violations were common throughout the Presidencies of Rodrigo Duterte and Ferdinand Marcos Jr., and have similarly been used to repress support, dissent and opposition ahead of the May 2025 Midterm Elections.

Human rights organizations have raised concerns about the pattern of abductions and enforced disappearances of human rights defenders during the first three years of Marcos Jr’s Presidency. In April 2025, there were two separate incidents of abduction and illegal arrests of individuals campaigning for progressive partylist candidates. Pauline Joy Banjawan, Southern Tagalog campaign coordinator for Bayan Muna, was abducted and found two days later in the custody of the Philippine National Police at the Batangas jail. According to Bayan Muna, Banjawan underwent physical and mental torture for two days while in the hands of the Phiilppine military in an effort to suppress opposition ahead of the May elections. Similarly in Isabela province, Kabataan Partylist coordinator Andy Magno was illegally arrested on April 25. Abduction, torture, and enforced disappearance are all violations of IHL.

This use of military force against civilians is a tool to intimidate political opposition and suppress democratic participation in the election process. It violates the rights of the most marginalized and oppressed sectors of Philippine society and silences any and all forms of advocacy for basic demands around wages, land, and sovereignty. A free and fair electoral process is not genuinely possible when civilians are intimidated and silenced from participating in the broader democratic struggle for their collective rights.

Highlight Incidents

Killing of two youths in Masbate

In December of 2024, alleged members of the Philippine military killed two youths in Uson, Masbate, Bicol Region as they returned home from a Christmas party. The killing of JP Osabel, 14, and Redjan Montealegre, 18, was a clear violation of IHL. The killings followed a pattern of attacks on civilians in the Bicol Region in recent years, where members of the AFP have fabricated encounters with the New People’s Army (NPA) to justify targeting civilians.

Aerial bombing and strafing in Mindoro

On March 1, 2025, members of the AFP conducted aerial bombing and strafing in an alleged military encounter in Mansalay, Oriental Mindoro. Strafing and bombing of civilian areas violates the principle of distinction in IHL, which provides that parties to an armed conflict must “at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.”

Report of the International Observer Mission (IOM) for the 2025 Philippine Elections

Read the full report in PDF form here

The Philippines has long been a hotspot for electoral violence, particularly in rural areas. This remains true in the 2025 midterm elections, with a heightened number of cases of election-related killings in the northern province of Abra and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in southern Philippines.

The Philippine National Police Public Information Office reported a troubling total of 62 incidents from January 12 to April 28, 2025. Of these, a staggering 35 were confirmed as election-related, highlighting significant concerns about the safety and integrity of the electoral process during this critical period.. Of the 35 incidents, 11 occurred in the Cordillera region, eight in BARMM, five in the southern Luzon region of Calabarzon, three in the Zamboanga Peninsula, two incidents each in Western Visayas and Davao, and one case each in the regions of Ilocos, Central Luzon, Eastern Visayas, and Soccsksargen in Mindanao.

This is supported by data gathered by the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR), which recorded 13 cases of electoral killings and attacks from February 18 to April 10, 2025. Nine of the 13 cases were recorded in Abra, a province in northern Philippines, notoriously known for its feuding political families, each backed by their own private armies and goons. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has placed three towns in Abra in the “orange” category, signifying areas facing serious armed threats. Six other towns are classified in the “yellow” category, which means areas with a history of election violence. 

In BARMM, the municipalities of Buluan and Maguindanao del Sur, along with Datu Odin Sinsuat in Maguindanao del Norte, have all been placed under COMELEC control. The COMELEC decision came after several killings in the region in the past months. On March 28, newly appointed COMELEC officer Maceda Abo was ambushed in broad daylight in the municipality of Odin Sinsuat. Abo and her husband were killed in the attack. 

On April 14, just two weeks later, provincial board member candidate Baba Omar survived an ambush in the town of Datu Anggal Midtimbang in Maguindanao del Sur. Five days later, a resident of Barangay Mangudadatu was wounded after three hand grenades were thrown near the municipal hall of Buluan in the same province. 

All these attacks happened despite the nationwide implementation of a gun ban by the Philippine government on January 12, which marked the beginning of the election period. Violence continues to mount in the BARMM region despite the polls happening later this year. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed Republic Act 12123 last February, officially postponing the BARMM elections to October 2025, a move opposed by different groups, citing concerns about regional peace and security.

Journalists are not spared from the killings. On April 29, veteran publisher Juan Dayang was watching TV inside his home in the Aklan province when he was shot three times by an unknown assailant, resulting in his death. This adds to the rising number of attacks against the media under the current administration. From July 1, 2022, to April 30, 2025, the CMFR has documented 184 cases of attacks and threats against media workers since Marcos Jr. became president. 

Despite the Philippines climbing to 116th rank out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom ranking of Reporters Without Borders (RSF), the case of Dayang and the continuing attacks against journalists during and beyond elections remains troubling for press freedom in the country. 

But electoral violence had already begun before the campaign period. From October 2024, when candidacy certificates were filed until February 17, 2025, the CMFR counted 29 attacks reported in the media. Out of 29 targeted victims, 24 have lost their lives, an alarming indicator of escalating violence. This trend is not coincidental; it is fueled by the chilling remarks made by former President Rodrigo Duterte, who brazenly declared during a rally that 15 opposition senators ought to be “killed” to clear the way for his party’s candidates. 

According to Peter Kreuzer of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, targeted killings of politicians have been an innate part of Philippine democratic processes since independence in 1946, but have significantly increased since 2016. 

Targeted killings may occur because of revenge or to eliminate an opponent, as well as economic motives, which are made worse by the connection between politics and illegal businesses. Political dynasties are also a factor, causing conflict between political families or even within families. However, the public may not know the full scale of the killings at election time, as killings of high-profile politicians and election officers often receive more widespread attention, while killings of local and grassroots political figures are often underreported. 

However, the killings are not limited solely to those who are running for a seat in government. At the press conference launching for the 2025 International Observer Mission (IOM), local electoral watchdog Kontra Daya convenor Prof. Danilo Arao reported that, “Activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens are being harassed, attacked, and in many cases, killed, often by state forces such as the military and police.”

The 2022 IOM similarly documented election-related human rights violations, including political killings, shootings, abductions, death threats, political arrests and detention, harassment and surveillance of candidates and supporters, large-scale red tagging, widespread vote-buying, media manipulation and repression, fake news and harassment of journalists. 

These violations began in January 2022, with the first election-related killings taking place in Sorsogon, Bicol Region. The mission concluded that the 2022 elections failed to meet the international standard of a free, honest, and fair election. The prevailing conditions, including killings and the threat of killings, “robbed the voters of access to reliable information, access to the voting places without intimidation, and a credible vote counting system.”

The 2022 elections also saw then-presidential candidate Ferdinand Marcos Jr. whitewashing the human rights violations of his father’s rule, insisting falsely that the martial law era was the “golden years” of Philippine history. 

Electoral violence in the Philippines has its roots in its history of colonialism under Spain and the United States, with political leaders like Marcos Jr. still “bearing the marks of colonial collaboration” and oligarchy. Chris Magno, an associate professor at Gannon University, argues that long-standing, systemic factors perpetuate electoral violence, with the historical role of warlords and private militias continuing to influence the political process and contribute to the cycle of violence and impunity. 

The threat of violence and ongoing killings are realities in the 2025 election cycle in the Philippines. This deserves attention from journalists, the COMELEC, political leaders, and the international community. Elections cannot be truly free, honest, nor fair while voters are intimidated by the threat of violence during the political process.

Highlight Incidents

Kerwin Espinosa shot on campaign trail in Albuera

On April 10, 2025, Kerwin Espinosa, mayoral candidate for Albuera, Leyte, was shot at a campaign event. A suspect has been arrested but the police have not shared any details as of April 11. Also wounded were vice-mayoral candidate Mariel Espinosa and a minor. Espinosa accuses 7 police officers of Ormoc City as being behind the frustrated killing. Espinosa has previously been entangled in drug trade charges. He came to prominence when he testified in 2016 against Senator Leila De Lima, linking her to the illicit drug trade. In 2022, he retracted his statements, saying he was forced to lie by the police after the killing of his father, former mayor of Albuera, Leyte, Rolando Espinosa. 

Maguindanao poll exec, husband killed in ambush

On April 10, 2025, municipal election officer Bai Maceda Lidasan-Abo of Datu Odin Sinsuat town in Maguindanao del Norte province was killed in an ambush along with her husband. She was on her way to the office in Datu Odin Sinsuat’s Barangay Dalican when armed men fired at her vehicle, resulting in their deaths.

Cagayan town mayor shot dead during campaign sortie

On April 23, 2025, Incumbent Rizal, Cagayan Mayor Joel Ruma was shot dead during a campaign rally. Based on a police report from Police Regional Office 2, Ruma and another civilian — a certain Merson Abiguebel — were shot while they were attending a campaign rally in Barangay Illuru Sur in Rizal, Cagayan at around 9:30 p.m. According to police, the suspected shooter, who remains at large, managed to escape after the incident.

Veteran journo, ex-Kalibo Mayor Dayang, 89, slain at Aklan home

Juan “Johnny” Dayang, an 89-year-old veteran journalist based in Aklan province, was watching television Tuesday night when three bullets were fired through the window of his living room at Barangay Andagao in the province’s capital town of Kalibo. Provincial police said they had yet to establish the motive behind the murder but assured that all angles were being considered, including politics and his background as a journalist.

---

ICHRP is conducting an International Observer Mission in 2025 to monitor for elections-related human rights violations. Learn more at https://www.ichrp.net/IOM2025

Report of the International Observer Mission (IOM) for the 2025 Philippine Elections

Read the full report in PDF form here

The 2025 Philippine elections are dominated by political dynasties – an oligarchy of elite families rooted in the feudal land and political structures that pervade Philippine society. These groups have historically relied heavily on patronage politics to maintain their influence. The domination of specific families at the local, provincial and national level resembles a caste system, where only the feudal ‘princes and princesses’ born into privilege can find a door to enter the political system. Powerful and wealthy Filipino families who hold positions at the national and regional level have tremendous economic power. People depend on them for their livelihood – jobs, land, and careers.

In the past, there has been some effort to diminish the power of the Philippine oligarchy, but the implementation of this legislation depends on Congress, which is dominated by the very same political dynasties. Despite a 1987 constitutional ban on dynasties, their power has only continued to grow. 

Three of the country’s 10 wealthiest multi-billionaire tycoons are behind three of the country’s five biggest political parties – Manny Villar (Nacionalista), Ramon Ang (Nationalist People’s Coalition), and Enrique Razon (National Unity Party). Their political parties accounted for one-third of the 18th Philippine Congress and are an ever-present fixture in presidential candidacies and governance. A fourth political faction is currently led by President Bongbong Marcos, who presides over the Marcos-Romualdez dynasty.

Four decades after the flight in disgrace of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the Marcos family has rehabilitated its legacy and strengthened its hold on Philippine politics. Marcos’s son and namesake, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., is president, and his sister Imee is a first term Senator alongside their cousins in Leyte, who represent the political clan of his mother, former First Lady Imelda Marcos. This year, at least five Marcoses are running for seats in the Senate, House, and the local government in Ilocos Norte. Based on the count of the Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ)’s, at least five Romualdezes are also running for various positions in Leyte.

The May 2025 elections are unlikely to bring significant change. In the current 19^th Congress, over half (142) of the District representatives seeking re-election belong to political dynasties. At least 71 of the country’s 82 provincial governments (87%) are led by members of political dynasties^[1].  Forty-seven of the 71 incumbent governors belonging to political dynasties are seeking re-election.  At the same time, 19 sitting governors who are not running for re-election have family members seeking to replace them^[2].

This dominance underscores a system where power is frequently passed down within families, raising concerns about its impact on democratic representation and political diversity. In addition to the Marcos-Romauldez clans of Ilocos Norte and Leyte there are about two dozen political dynasties seeking to occupy at least five seats each after the May 2025 elections. 

Among them are the; Singsons of Ilocos Sur; Hataman-Sallimans of Basilan; Ortegas of La Union, Dys of Isabela; Tulfos, Pacquiaos of South Cotabato and Sarangani; Dutertes of Davao City; Villar family of Las Piñas; Abaloses of Mandaluyong; Revillas and Tolentinos of Cavite; Ejercitos of Laguna and San Juan City; Khos of Masbate; Ynareses of Rizal; Khonghuns of Zambales; Duranos of Cebu; Dimaporos of Lanao Del Norte; Alonto-Adiongs of Lanao Del Sur; Ampatuans and Masturas of Maguindanao; and Tans of Sulu^[3].

To bypass legislative restrictions on terms in office, members of the same clan often substitute a relative or advance to a higher position. At least 67 outgoing district representatives have opted to switch positions with family members, ensuring their political influence remains intact.^[4] In Las Piñas City, Sen. Cynthia Villar and her daughter, Rep. Camille Villar, are swapping places, with the former sliding back to run as a congresswoman and the latter gunning for a Senate seat^[5]. The current Sen. Villar is reaching her term limit in the Senate this year.^[6]  

In the Senate, Cynthia Villiar and her son, Mark A Villar, are one of three family tandems in the Senate. The others are the siblings Alan Peter Cayetano and Pia Cayetano, half-brothers Jinggoy Ejercito and Joseph Victor G. Ejercito.  Both brothers of Senator Raffy Tulfo are running to join him in the Senate in 2025 so it could result in 4 family sets that when combined would control almost 40% of the Senate seats. 

Party-list System Hijacked by Political Dynasties

The Party list system, originally conceived in 1987 after the EDSA People Power uprising, was embedded in the Philippine constitution as a means of giving voice to marginalized and disadvantaged groups. This system has been increasingly corrupted by political dynasties. Research by the PCIJ showed that 36 of the 54 party-list groups (66%) in the current 19th Congress have at least one nominee belonging to a political family.^[7]

In the May 2025 elections, at least 78 out of the 156 party-list organizations certified by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) belong to political families.^[8] Speaker Romualdez (of the Marcos-Romualdez clan), who is seeking re-election as Leyte’s 1st District representative for the sixth time, is introducing his son Andrew to politics through the party-list system. The younger Romualdez is set to replace his mother Yedda as first nominee for the Tingog party-list group^[9]. The flawed party-list system has been criticized as a “backdoor” to the House for political dynasties and big businesses.^[10]

There has been a proliferation of regional party list groups that are led by members of political dynasties.  In the Visayas, Abag-Promdi is represented by Mariano Mimo Osmeña, son of the late Cebu Gov. Lito Osmeña^[11]. Barkadahan Para Sa Bansa party-list group is fielding a member of the notorious Durano political clan, also of Cebu province. Danao City Mayor Thomas Durano is the nephew of former Danao Mayor Ramon Durano Jr.^[12]

When it comes to local governments, at least 113 out of 149 city mayors (75%) belong to political dynasties. Out of 149 city mayors, 56 have relatives as either their vice-mayors or councilors. In the 2025 elections, a total of 80, or about 53% of all city mayors, are from dynasties seeking re-election. Meanwhile, 27 sitting city mayors are considering relatives to replace them as most of them run for other positions^[13].  

Political dynasties are inherent in a society marked by high inequality and poverty, which stem from the historical concentration of land and wealth ownership in the hands of a few. It is almost impossible to compete for political office without significant wealth, limiting successful candidates to those born in families of economic and political elites. This is true even in the local elections. According to data from IBON Foundation, the average spending per candidate for the elective positions in 2022 are as follows: President (P3 billion), Vice President (P1 billion), Senator (P350 million), Congress (P15 million), Governor (P15 million), Vice Governor (P7.5 million), Board Member (P1 million), Mayor (P3 million), Vice Mayor (P1.5 million), and Councilor (P100,000). Compare this to the average across-the-country minimum wage of P470, and it is clear that running for public office is an affair of the ruling elite.

The dynastic concentration of political power has become more pronounced over the past 20 years. By 2025, approximately 80% of provincial governors belong to “fat dynasties“^[14], up from 57% in 2004. Similarly, dynastic representation in the House of Representatives has risen to 67% from 48% in 2004, and mayoral posts held by dynasties increased to 53% from 40%. In the 2022 Senate elections, at least 12.5% (3) leading candidates had relatives already in the 24 -seat chamber. Notably, 4.5% (800 out of 18,000) positions contested had single candidates from warlord political clans against whom no one dared to contest.^[15]

There is a correlation between dynastic concentration and poverty. A 2015 study released by the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) noted “Dynasties are pervasive in the 10 poorest provinces that are afflicted by low levels of human development, bad governance, violence and poor business climates,”^[16]Apart from a direct link to poverty incidence, political dynasties also tend to undermine democratic processes by weakening the checks and balances in the government and the political system. Essentially, the historic feudal and social and economic system have created a trajectory whereby the political system becomes less and less democratic with each electoral cycle. 

---

^[1] https://pcij.org/2024/12/08/governors-political-dynasties-philippines-provinces-elections/

^[2] https://pcij.org/2024/12/08/governors-political-dynasties-philippines-provinces-elections/

^[3] https://pcij.org/2024/10/25/fat-political-dynasties-philippines-elections/

^[4] https://pcij.org/2024/10/26/lower-house-district-representatives-political-dynasties-reelection/

^[5] https://pcij.org/2024/10/26/lower-house-district-representatives-political-dynasties-reelection/

^[6] https://kodao.org/5-ways-philippine-dynasties-are-able-to-stay-in-power/

^[7] https://pcij.org/2024/12/04/political-dynasties-also-swarm-the-party-list-elections/

^[8] In the May 2025 elections, at least 78 out of the 156 party-list organizations certified by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) also belong to political families.

^[9] https://kodao.org/5-ways-philippine-dynasties-are-able-to-stay-in-power/

^[10] https://kodao.org/5-ways-philippine-dynasties-are-able-to-stay-in-power/

^[11] https://pcij.org/2024/12/04/political-dynasties-also-swarm-the-party-list-elections/

^[12]https://pcij.org/2024/12/04/political-dynasties-also-swarm-the-party-list-elections/

^[13] https://pcij.org/2025/01/26/113-out-of-149-philippine-cities-also-ruled-by-political-dynasties/

^[14] There are two types of political dynasties, thin and fat, according to the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. A thin dynasty is one in which a political clan is able to manipulate one elected position over time. A fat dynasty is one in which a political clan holds multiple government positions simultaneously. According to Prof. Ronald Mendoza, “The more fat dynasties you have, the more poverty there’s likely to be.” 

^[15] After Duterte: clan politics and US influence in the Philippines, /morningstaronline.co.uk, 19 March 2025.

^[16] https://businessmirror.com.ph/2015/08/20/pervasive-political-dynasty-worsened-poverty-in-phl/

---

ICHRP is conducting an International Observer Mission in 2025 to monitor for elections-related human rights violations. Learn more at https://www.ichrp.net/IOM2025

Report of the International Observer Mission (IOM) for the 2025 Philippine Elections

Read the full report in PDF form here

Red-tagging finds its way on top of the list of campaign violations for the 2025 Philippine midterm elections. A prevalent human rights violation characterized as harassment, intimidation and vilification, in the Philippines it is an act of labelling individuals and groups as members, supporters or affiliates of armed communist insurgents. Overwhelmingly, it comprises 78.7 percent of the violations monitored by election watchdog and 2025 IOM partner Vote Report PH as of April 30.

Red-tagging traces its roots in McCarthyism during the 1940s and 1950s in the United States. Under the backdrop of a Cold War against the Soviet Union, the US government engaged in a widespread witch hunt for individuals suspected of espousing left-leaning beliefs and ideologies. The Philippine state has similarly engaged in red-tagging for decades, often targeting progressive individuals, activists, human rights advocates, and anyone it perceives as critical of its policies. It has seen an unprecedented spike under the Duterte administration and continues without let up under the Marcos Jr. government.

On May 12, Filipinos will exercise their right to vote in the 2025 midterm elections. Aside from being one of the hallmarks of democracy, the election season is also the period when the Filipino population is the most politically active. It is a natural time for people and candidates to have vibrant and honest discussions about the problems faced by the Filipino people, including the hurdles that stand in the way of genuine economic progress, peace, and security, and solutions to these problems.

On February 20, 2024, the Philippine Supreme Court declared in their groundbreaking decision on Derudo v Vinoya that the practice of red-tagging is a threat to the fundamental right to “life, liberty, and security.” On February 19, 2025, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) also issued Resolution No. 11116 which says that “branding individuals, groups, or organizations as “vocal dissenters,” “activists,” or sympathizers of subversive or terrorist groups” without evidence is considered unjust labeling and could lead to penalties. Individuals red-tagged by state institutions and their agents are accused of supporting the communist insurgency and are harassed, threatened, even disappeared or killed. Despite the Supreme Court ruling, the Marcos Jr. administration has failed to take measures that would end red-tagging, including abolishing the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC). 

This government task force was formed under Duterte and has persistently carried out the practice against activists, leaders of people’s organizations, journalists and lawyers. UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression Irene Khan in her visit to the Philippines last January 2024 recommended that the NTF-ELCAC be abolished, a move supported by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). 

But despite these legal deterrents and strong condemnation by several institutions, data from election watchdogs show that red-tagging continues unabated. Progressive electoral candidates regardless of affiliation are targeted in these elections.

The multi-faceted character of red-tagging has earned it the distinction of being an electoral violation, a human rights violation, and an international humanitarian law (IHL) violation all at the same time. Red-tagging also constitutes a war crime since civilians’ lives are endangered when they are linked to the armed movement of the Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army – National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF). In some cases, red-tagging is followed by surveillance, harassment, abduction, and even outright killing. 

The massacre of the Fausto family in Negros Occidental clearly shows the dangers of red-tagging. Billy Fausto and his wife Emelda Fausto, along with their two minor children Ben and Raben were massacred inside their homes in the late night of June 14, 2023. Prior to the horrific killings, Billy Fausto and his family have been routinely red-tagged and accused of being supporters of the NPA. There were also instances when Billy was forced by the military to guide them in their nightly patrolling in the area. Billy and his spouse were merely members of a local farmers and farmworkers association.

Swaying people from casting their vote for any candidates through fear, intimidation, and disinformation campaigns is the opposite of a fair, free, clean and honest election process. Red-tagging silences those discussions by trying to discredit, through misinformation and harassment, proposals for reforms and people-centered solutions.  These discussions give substance to the right to vote by giving voters the chance to engage with and affirm candidates that have the political will to respond to the pressing problems faced by the people. 

Case Studies

Karapatan criticizes NTF-ELCAC for video red-tagging Kabataan Partylist Rep. Raoul Manuel

On February 18, 2025, human rights group Karapatan criticized the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) for releasing a video that “Red-tagged” Kabataan party list Rep. Raoul Manuel. The group was referring to a video posted on the Facebook page of the NTF-Elcac on Feb. 6, which tagged Manuel as a recruiter for the New People’s Army (NPA).

Comelec Red-tagged by Fellow Government Agency

On February 20, 2025, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) yesterday accused a fellow government agency of “red tagging” the poll body, even as it issued a new policy prohibiting discriminatory and harassment acts during the campaign period for the May elections. Comelec Chairman George Garcia said the agency, which he declined to identify, sent a letter warning the poll body against issuing the new policy.

Makabayan Candidates File Complaint Against NTF-ELCAC for Red-tagging

On April 22, 2025, leaders and candidates from the Makabayan coalition filed an election offense complaint in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) against the NTF-ELCAC Executive Director Ernesto Torres Jr. for a series of red-tagging and defamatory statements against the coalition’s candidates during the campaign period. They said Torres Jr. violated COMELEC Resolution No. 11116 which prohibits “labeling” of individuals or organizations as terrorists, dissenters, and criminals without evidence.

---

ICHRP is conducting an International Observer Mission in 2025 to monitor for elections-related human rights violations. Learn more at https://www.ichrp.net/IOM2025