Report of the International Observer Mission (IOM) for the 2025 Philippine Elections

Read the full report in PDF form here

Three issues have historically plagued elections in the Philippines: vote buying, electronic voting issues, and disenfranchisement of overseas voters. All three of these concerns were well documented in the reports of the 2022 IOM. Throughout this year’s 2025 midterm election season, these three issues have continued to impact voters’ participation in the elections on a wide scale throughout the country.

Vote Buying 

In 2022, the final recommendation of the IOM report of the International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines (ICHRP) stated, “Vote-buying is rampant and since it is illegal, vote-buyers must be apprehended and sanctioned to minimize or eliminate this practice”. Despite being proscribed under Article 22 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which defines vote buying as “giving, offering, or promising money, favors, or jobs in exchange for getting a person’s vote for the candidate or causing the person to vote against somebody else”, the practice has been and continues to plague Philippine elections.

According to an analysis conducted in 2018, “Vote buying among the poor is indeed very common, but the incidence varies depending on the vote buying type. The most prevalent form uses more benign goods such as food and clothing, but offers of money is still reported by more than a quarter of respondents. Different vote-buying types also have different correlates, including some socio-economic factors, suggesting that it is a finely targeted activity. In addition, money vote buying is predominant in tight elections, but buying votes using non-monetary offers is more common when there is a clear winner even before the election”

In 2022, the IOM in Eastern Visayas witnessed vote buying—50, 100, 500 and 1,000 peso bills with the name of the candidates written on them being handed out. Some people received several bills for different candidates. They saw a ‘volunteer’ supporting one local candidate who had a list of all the voters in one barangay, and who was passing from door to door to give money for his candidate.

As of April 25^, this year, the COMELEC reported at least 158 complaints lodged during the campaign season against election candidates for vote buying, vote selling and abuse of government funds and assets. COMELEC Chairman George Erwin Garcia told the media in a message that the poll body had issued 74 show cause orders for vote-buying and/or abuse of state resources allegations so far.

Among those issued show cause orders were Las Piñas Rep. Camille Villar, who is running for senator; Manila Mayor Honey Lacuna and her rivals Isko Moreno and Sam Versoza; Marikina mayoral bet Stella Quimbo and re-electionist Malabon Mayor Jeannie Sandoval. Another of those under show cause orders was Esmael Magundadatu, the 2010 candidate for Governor of Maguindanao, whose wife and sisters were killed along with 37 journalists in the Maguindanao Massacre, the worst act of election violence in the history of Philippine elections. A small number of candidates have had their campaigns suspended by the COMELEC because of substantiated cases of vote buying. 

The persistence of vote buying corrupts the democratic process, and at the same time, is a mirror of the power structures that exist in Philippine society. Mass poverty in the Philippines creates the foundation for vote-buying by rich and powerful elites, and high inequality has led to a well-entrenched political system whereby control of local, regional, provincial and national political positions are a means to self-enrichment and empowerment giving rise to dynasties. The persistence of feudal patron client relations all support the system of vote buying, with a majority of Philippine provinces being led by members of political dynasties. Vote buying is widely perceived as a problem, but only a fraction of those committing it are actually sanctioned by the Comelec. 

Disenfranchisement of OFWs

The disenfranchisement of overseas voters begins with the registration process. For the current 2025 poll, there are 1.24 million registered overseas voters. In 2022, despite the pandemic, about 1.7 million registered to vote and participated in the overseas absentee voting (OAV). In 2019, the last time mid-term elections were held, there were 1.82 million overseas voters registered.

The precipitous drop (31.9% since 2019) in registered voters among overseas Filipinos is a significant concern, and speaks to a process which is disenfranchising hundreds of thousands of potential overseas voters. This disenfranchisement has taken place due to difficulties in pre-enrolling online and other technical issues.

Biometrics errors are constant, especially in passport and face identification. For example, the OFWs who reach the 5-minute timeout during registration have to fill everything out over again. According to Tabs Ponciano of Malaya Movement USA, “Our OFWs are already irritated because it’s been half a day, they still haven’t registered for pre-enrollment”.

The COMELEC’s administration of the new internet overseas voting process has also raised concerns about voter suppression. Many registered voters are still unaware of the online voting system, and that there is a three-step process to voting: 1) registration; 2) pre-enrollment, even for registered voters; and 3) voting. Each step is a complex morass of verification. The COMELEC started the pre-enrollment process on March 20, just a few weeks before online voting began on April 13. This was not enough time to inform overseas Filipinos that they cannot vote if they do not pre-enroll. After considerable lobbying from overseas organizations, the COMELEC extended the deadline for the pre-registration process from May 7 to May 10.

The National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), which specializes in election technology, could not categorically express confidence in the OVCS (Overseas Voting and Counting System). “Outside of the trusted build, we were unable to see the end-to-end test of the OVCS…There was not enough visibility for us to determine what they were doing with the system, and to me, that was a problem,” said Namfrel national chairperson Lito Averia. 

Transparency was also a concern expressed by Jona Yang of the Computer Professionals Union, who stated, “Kailangan siguraduhin na may casted vote verification o in simpler terms, resibo, na makikita ng ating mga kababayan kung sino ang kabilang ibinoto, at hindi yung… code na hindi natin naiintindihan, kumbaga, mababasa lang siya ng computer“ (We need to make sure that there is a casted vote verification or in simpler terms, a receipt, so that voters can see who they voted for, and not the code that we don’t understand, that can only be read by the computer).

The complexity of the registration process has already resulted in a decade-low level of voter registration among overseas Filipinos. This, combined with the new requirements for pre-enrollment, will likely result in a voter turnout below the normally low participation rate of 40% among OFWs.  

Integrity of the Electronic Voting System

In the past, vote counting was painfully slow, and it could take days to declare a victor in many of the races. This led to widespread concerns about fraudulent counts and resulted in the recent move to vote counting machines. However, the voting machines have proven to be less reliable than manual counts. Previous elections have seen power outages, which resulted in the failure of machines, as well as missing ballots at some polling stations. Previous elections have also seen reports of election officials selling victories in some ridings suggesting that the previous voting machines (Smartmatic) themselves were open to manipulation. 

The 2022 IOM report also expressed concerns about the electronic voting system, stating, “The electronic voting system is not transparent. It is not possible to independently audit and verify the vote under the current system of voting”. These remain major concerns for the 2025 elections. The 2022 IOM recommended, “Vote Counting Machines are too unreliable and should be replaced by manual counting, with votes cast being published at the voting centers before results are transmitted to the provincial and national counting centers. The vote counting algorithm must be independently verified as accurate prior to the election. There needs to be a transparent process of verification”. 

The new process for vote counting launched in 2025 continues to be criticized for a lack of transparency by poll watchers. According to Tabs Ponciano of the Malaya Movement USA, “Marami naman tayong mga kababayan na hindi rin coders, pero ang nakikita nila, o nare-receive nila after i-submit ‘yung kanilang boto, is itong 146-page code containing ‘yung ballot content. Ito ‘yung confirmation… Hindi siya klaro. Hindi naman siya totoong confirmation of voting. Ilegible siya for most people” (There are many Filipinos who are not coders, but what they see, or receive after submitting their vote, is this 146-page code containing the ballot content. This is the confirmation… It is not clear. It is not a real confirmation of voting. It is illegible for most people.)

The several weaknesses of this system can be mitigated. The 2025 IOM supports Kontra Daya’s push for a “hybrid” method – to hold online transmission of votes, but undertake manual counting. This proposal is to ensure more transparency in the process compared to relying on automated processes both for transmission and counting. Vote Report PH has cited concerns about proprietary source codes for the vote counting machines (VCMs) that lack transparency.  The IOM 2025 believes that increasing transparency in the electoral process through measures such as manual counting of electronic votes would serve to improve confidence in the integrity of the system and would improve electoral participation. 

News Release 
May 10, 2025

With just two days before Filipinos head to the polls, the rights group led International Observer Mission (IOM) has raised alarm over a troubling surge in vote-buying and election-related violence. “We’re gravely concerned about the reported number of red-tagging, vote-buying and especially killings,” said IOM Commissioner Colleen Moore.

The IOM, consisting of commissioners and international observers, has been monitoring the situation closely since the campaign period began. They have been deployed to key election hotspots across the three major islands of the country to monitor the election landscape. Notably, several reported violations have been directly witnessed and documented by IOM observers stationed in various regions throughout the country.

It’s the second time that the International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines (ICHRP), a rights group, is holding its IOM in the country.

“Our mission is ongoing, but what we have observed so far is deeply concerning,” said Commissioner Moore, Director of Peace with Justice at the General Board of Church and Society, the social justice agency of the United Methodist Church, based in Washington DC. “The red-tagging of candidates, widespread vote-buying, and political killings are serious violations that threaten the integrity of the electoral process and the safety of our communities.”

While the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has acknowledged receiving at least 158 complaints related to vote-buying, the IOM’s ground teams have independently recorded 18 more vote-buying incidents in known election hotspots. 

These cases, observed by teams in the field, show payments ranging from P150 to as much as P5,000 per voter, with most violations traced to entrenched political dynasties. IOM observers have independently confirmed the widespread use of cash and goods in exchange for votes, especially in rural and high-poverty areas.

577 red-tagging cases: Candidates, supporters under attack

So far, the IOM and Vote Report PH have documented 577 cases of red-tagging, with multiple cases directly observed across all three major island groups. Victims include candidates along with their campaign staff, local organizers, and supporters. Observers report a flood of red-tagging materials: flyers, leaflets, and posters falsely linking individuals and groups to the armed insurgency are being distributed in communities and plastered on walls near campaign venues. IOM field teams noted that progressive candidates, party-list groups, poll workers, and even the COMELEC itself have become targets.

“This level of systematic red-tagging is not only a violation of human rights, it’s a coordinated effort to intimidate and discredit democratic actors,” said Commissioner Moore. “It’s an attack on the very idea of free and fair elections.”

In addition, the mission has also documented 48 cases of threats, harassment, and intimidation in areas including Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, and Northern Mindanao. 

Political violence has escalated dramatically in recent weeks. From January 12 to April 28, the Philippine authorities recorded 62 incidents of election-related violence, 35 of which were confirmed to be politically motivated. IOM observers in the Cordillera Adminstrative Region (located in the north-central part of Luzon island), Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, and Region IV-A (located east and south of Metro Manila) noted alarming trends of armed intimidation and even killings.

Among the most disturbing cases monitored:

• April 10: Mayoral candidate Kerwin Espinosa was shot during a campaign sortie in Albuera, Leyte. He has accused the police of orchestrating the attack.
• March 26: Municipal election officer Bai Maceda Lidasan-Abo and her husband were ambushed and killed in Maguindanao del Norte.
• April 23: Rizal, Cagayan Mayor Joel Ruma was shot dead at a campaign rally.
• April 29: Veteran journalist and ex-Kalibo Mayor Johnny Dayang was gunned down in his home, sparking fears of intensifying attacks on independent media.

Even the COMELEC has not been spared. On February 20, COMELEC Chair George Garcia revealed that another government agency had red-tagged the poll body itself for issuing resolutions banning discriminatory campaign tactics. 

The IOM stressed that with two full days left before election day, the situation remains fluid and the risks are growing. The mission is actively expanding its presence on the ground and will continue to closely monitor unfolding events.

“Our work is far from over,” said Commissioner Moore. “We are committed to accompanying the Filipino people through these final, critical days and beyond to ensure that the true situation is documented and that accountability is pursued.”

The IOM will release a statement of the initial findings shortly after election day, identifying patterns of concern. A comprehensive final report containing full analysis and concrete recommendations will be made public and presented to international human rights institutions, relevant United Nations bodies, foreign embassies and parliaments, civil society, and media community.

“We know the stakes are high. But so is the determination of those committed to democracy,” says the IOM in a statement. “We will keep watching, documenting, and doing our work in support of the Filipinos in this election.”#

Report of the International Observer Mission (IOM) for the 2025 Philippine Elections

Read the full report in PDF form here

The 2025 Philippine Midterm Elections have been marred by significant violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), or the rules of war. This is especially true in the impoverished rural communities throughout the Philippine countryside that are plagued by increasing militarization by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), as well as presence of foreign troops including those from the United States. These IHL violations have been well documented under both the Duterte and Marcos Jr regimes, including by the 2024 International People’s Tribunal (IPT) which found both administrations guilty of war crimes against the Filipino people.

The Midterm Elections are unfolding against the backdrop of a decades-long armed conflict between the Government Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and a revolutionary national liberation movement represented by the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP). In response to the revolutionary movement, the GRP engages in violent repression of the Filipino people through “counterterrorism” and “counterinsurgency” campaigns which have led to widespread violations of human rights and IHL. Despite claims by Marcos Jr that the human rights situation has improved following the Duterte regime, militarization and war crimes by the AFP have intensified.

IHL is a set of rules which seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict and to reduce the human suffering caused by it. It requires belligerent forces to make a distinction between combatants and military objects on the one hand, and civilians and civilian objects on the other hand. As stated by Marjorie Cohn, an expert witness during the IPT, “The Philippines’ US-inspired counter-insurgency program does not distinguish between civilians and combatants, which is considered a war crime under the Geneva Conventions”. Under the guise of fighting the armed revolutionary movement, the GRP’s counterinsurgency campaigns have deliberately targeted any and all forms of dissent, including the campaigning of activists and civilian organizations. They are carried out by the various state and state-aligned machineries including the AFP, Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and various other militia and vigilante groups.

These campaigns have received the cooperation and support of the United States Government through military aid, training, weapons and deployment of US troops to military bases in the Philippines. Ahead of the 2025 Midterm Elections, the US State Department approved two arms sales to the Philippine Government for $336 million in February, and $120 million in April.

The 2022 International Observers Mission (IOM) documented instances of election-related violations of IHL against civilians, including political killings, shootings, abductions, political arrests and detention, harassment and surveillance of candidates and supporters, and red-tagging. These violations were common throughout the Presidencies of Rodrigo Duterte and Ferdinand Marcos Jr., and have similarly been used to repress support, dissent and opposition ahead of the May 2025 Midterm Elections.

Human rights organizations have raised concerns about the pattern of abductions and enforced disappearances of human rights defenders during the first three years of Marcos Jr’s Presidency. In April 2025, there were two separate incidents of abduction and illegal arrests of individuals campaigning for progressive partylist candidates. Pauline Joy Banjawan, Southern Tagalog campaign coordinator for Bayan Muna, was abducted and found two days later in the custody of the Philippine National Police at the Batangas jail. According to Bayan Muna, Banjawan underwent physical and mental torture for two days while in the hands of the Phiilppine military in an effort to suppress opposition ahead of the May elections. Similarly in Isabela province, Kabataan Partylist coordinator Andy Magno was illegally arrested on April 25. Abduction, torture, and enforced disappearance are all violations of IHL.

This use of military force against civilians is a tool to intimidate political opposition and suppress democratic participation in the election process. It violates the rights of the most marginalized and oppressed sectors of Philippine society and silences any and all forms of advocacy for basic demands around wages, land, and sovereignty. A free and fair electoral process is not genuinely possible when civilians are intimidated and silenced from participating in the broader democratic struggle for their collective rights.

Highlight Incidents

Killing of two youths in Masbate

In December of 2024, alleged members of the Philippine military killed two youths in Uson, Masbate, Bicol Region as they returned home from a Christmas party. The killing of JP Osabel, 14, and Redjan Montealegre, 18, was a clear violation of IHL. The killings followed a pattern of attacks on civilians in the Bicol Region in recent years, where members of the AFP have fabricated encounters with the New People’s Army (NPA) to justify targeting civilians.

Aerial bombing and strafing in Mindoro

On March 1, 2025, members of the AFP conducted aerial bombing and strafing in an alleged military encounter in Mansalay, Oriental Mindoro. Strafing and bombing of civilian areas violates the principle of distinction in IHL, which provides that parties to an armed conflict must “at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.”

Report of the International Observer Mission (IOM) for the 2025 Philippine Elections

Read the full report in PDF form here

The Philippines has long been a hotspot for electoral violence, particularly in rural areas. This remains true in the 2025 midterm elections, with a heightened number of cases of election-related killings in the northern province of Abra and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in southern Philippines.

The Philippine National Police Public Information Office reported a troubling total of 62 incidents from January 12 to April 28, 2025. Of these, a staggering 35 were confirmed as election-related, highlighting significant concerns about the safety and integrity of the electoral process during this critical period.. Of the 35 incidents, 11 occurred in the Cordillera region, eight in BARMM, five in the southern Luzon region of Calabarzon, three in the Zamboanga Peninsula, two incidents each in Western Visayas and Davao, and one case each in the regions of Ilocos, Central Luzon, Eastern Visayas, and Soccsksargen in Mindanao.

This is supported by data gathered by the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR), which recorded 13 cases of electoral killings and attacks from February 18 to April 10, 2025. Nine of the 13 cases were recorded in Abra, a province in northern Philippines, notoriously known for its feuding political families, each backed by their own private armies and goons. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has placed three towns in Abra in the “orange” category, signifying areas facing serious armed threats. Six other towns are classified in the “yellow” category, which means areas with a history of election violence. 

In BARMM, the municipalities of Buluan and Maguindanao del Sur, along with Datu Odin Sinsuat in Maguindanao del Norte, have all been placed under COMELEC control. The COMELEC decision came after several killings in the region in the past months. On March 28, newly appointed COMELEC officer Maceda Abo was ambushed in broad daylight in the municipality of Odin Sinsuat. Abo and her husband were killed in the attack. 

On April 14, just two weeks later, provincial board member candidate Baba Omar survived an ambush in the town of Datu Anggal Midtimbang in Maguindanao del Sur. Five days later, a resident of Barangay Mangudadatu was wounded after three hand grenades were thrown near the municipal hall of Buluan in the same province. 

All these attacks happened despite the nationwide implementation of a gun ban by the Philippine government on January 12, which marked the beginning of the election period. Violence continues to mount in the BARMM region despite the polls happening later this year. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed Republic Act 12123 last February, officially postponing the BARMM elections to October 2025, a move opposed by different groups, citing concerns about regional peace and security.

Journalists are not spared from the killings. On April 29, veteran publisher Juan Dayang was watching TV inside his home in the Aklan province when he was shot three times by an unknown assailant, resulting in his death. This adds to the rising number of attacks against the media under the current administration. From July 1, 2022, to April 30, 2025, the CMFR has documented 184 cases of attacks and threats against media workers since Marcos Jr. became president. 

Despite the Philippines climbing to 116th rank out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom ranking of Reporters Without Borders (RSF), the case of Dayang and the continuing attacks against journalists during and beyond elections remains troubling for press freedom in the country. 

But electoral violence had already begun before the campaign period. From October 2024, when candidacy certificates were filed until February 17, 2025, the CMFR counted 29 attacks reported in the media. Out of 29 targeted victims, 24 have lost their lives, an alarming indicator of escalating violence. This trend is not coincidental; it is fueled by the chilling remarks made by former President Rodrigo Duterte, who brazenly declared during a rally that 15 opposition senators ought to be “killed” to clear the way for his party’s candidates. 

According to Peter Kreuzer of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, targeted killings of politicians have been an innate part of Philippine democratic processes since independence in 1946, but have significantly increased since 2016. 

Targeted killings may occur because of revenge or to eliminate an opponent, as well as economic motives, which are made worse by the connection between politics and illegal businesses. Political dynasties are also a factor, causing conflict between political families or even within families. However, the public may not know the full scale of the killings at election time, as killings of high-profile politicians and election officers often receive more widespread attention, while killings of local and grassroots political figures are often underreported. 

However, the killings are not limited solely to those who are running for a seat in government. At the press conference launching for the 2025 International Observer Mission (IOM), local electoral watchdog Kontra Daya convenor Prof. Danilo Arao reported that, “Activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens are being harassed, attacked, and in many cases, killed, often by state forces such as the military and police.”

The 2022 IOM similarly documented election-related human rights violations, including political killings, shootings, abductions, death threats, political arrests and detention, harassment and surveillance of candidates and supporters, large-scale red tagging, widespread vote-buying, media manipulation and repression, fake news and harassment of journalists. 

These violations began in January 2022, with the first election-related killings taking place in Sorsogon, Bicol Region. The mission concluded that the 2022 elections failed to meet the international standard of a free, honest, and fair election. The prevailing conditions, including killings and the threat of killings, “robbed the voters of access to reliable information, access to the voting places without intimidation, and a credible vote counting system.”

The 2022 elections also saw then-presidential candidate Ferdinand Marcos Jr. whitewashing the human rights violations of his father’s rule, insisting falsely that the martial law era was the “golden years” of Philippine history. 

Electoral violence in the Philippines has its roots in its history of colonialism under Spain and the United States, with political leaders like Marcos Jr. still “bearing the marks of colonial collaboration” and oligarchy. Chris Magno, an associate professor at Gannon University, argues that long-standing, systemic factors perpetuate electoral violence, with the historical role of warlords and private militias continuing to influence the political process and contribute to the cycle of violence and impunity. 

The threat of violence and ongoing killings are realities in the 2025 election cycle in the Philippines. This deserves attention from journalists, the COMELEC, political leaders, and the international community. Elections cannot be truly free, honest, nor fair while voters are intimidated by the threat of violence during the political process.

Highlight Incidents

Kerwin Espinosa shot on campaign trail in Albuera

On April 10, 2025, Kerwin Espinosa, mayoral candidate for Albuera, Leyte, was shot at a campaign event. A suspect has been arrested but the police have not shared any details as of April 11. Also wounded were vice-mayoral candidate Mariel Espinosa and a minor. Espinosa accuses 7 police officers of Ormoc City as being behind the frustrated killing. Espinosa has previously been entangled in drug trade charges. He came to prominence when he testified in 2016 against Senator Leila De Lima, linking her to the illicit drug trade. In 2022, he retracted his statements, saying he was forced to lie by the police after the killing of his father, former mayor of Albuera, Leyte, Rolando Espinosa. 

Maguindanao poll exec, husband killed in ambush

On April 10, 2025, municipal election officer Bai Maceda Lidasan-Abo of Datu Odin Sinsuat town in Maguindanao del Norte province was killed in an ambush along with her husband. She was on her way to the office in Datu Odin Sinsuat’s Barangay Dalican when armed men fired at her vehicle, resulting in their deaths.

Cagayan town mayor shot dead during campaign sortie

On April 23, 2025, Incumbent Rizal, Cagayan Mayor Joel Ruma was shot dead during a campaign rally. Based on a police report from Police Regional Office 2, Ruma and another civilian — a certain Merson Abiguebel — were shot while they were attending a campaign rally in Barangay Illuru Sur in Rizal, Cagayan at around 9:30 p.m. According to police, the suspected shooter, who remains at large, managed to escape after the incident.

Veteran journo, ex-Kalibo Mayor Dayang, 89, slain at Aklan home

Juan “Johnny” Dayang, an 89-year-old veteran journalist based in Aklan province, was watching television Tuesday night when three bullets were fired through the window of his living room at Barangay Andagao in the province’s capital town of Kalibo. Provincial police said they had yet to establish the motive behind the murder but assured that all angles were being considered, including politics and his background as a journalist.

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ICHRP is conducting an International Observer Mission in 2025 to monitor for elections-related human rights violations. Learn more at https://www.ichrp.net/IOM2025

Report of the International Observer Mission (IOM) for the 2025 Philippine Elections

Read the full report in PDF form here

The 2025 Philippine elections are dominated by political dynasties – an oligarchy of elite families rooted in the feudal land and political structures that pervade Philippine society. These groups have historically relied heavily on patronage politics to maintain their influence. The domination of specific families at the local, provincial and national level resembles a caste system, where only the feudal ‘princes and princesses’ born into privilege can find a door to enter the political system. Powerful and wealthy Filipino families who hold positions at the national and regional level have tremendous economic power. People depend on them for their livelihood – jobs, land, and careers.

In the past, there has been some effort to diminish the power of the Philippine oligarchy, but the implementation of this legislation depends on Congress, which is dominated by the very same political dynasties. Despite a 1987 constitutional ban on dynasties, their power has only continued to grow. 

Three of the country’s 10 wealthiest multi-billionaire tycoons are behind three of the country’s five biggest political parties – Manny Villar (Nacionalista), Ramon Ang (Nationalist People’s Coalition), and Enrique Razon (National Unity Party). Their political parties accounted for one-third of the 18th Philippine Congress and are an ever-present fixture in presidential candidacies and governance. A fourth political faction is currently led by President Bongbong Marcos, who presides over the Marcos-Romualdez dynasty.

Four decades after the flight in disgrace of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the Marcos family has rehabilitated its legacy and strengthened its hold on Philippine politics. Marcos’s son and namesake, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., is president, and his sister Imee is a first term Senator alongside their cousins in Leyte, who represent the political clan of his mother, former First Lady Imelda Marcos. This year, at least five Marcoses are running for seats in the Senate, House, and the local government in Ilocos Norte. Based on the count of the Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ)’s, at least five Romualdezes are also running for various positions in Leyte.

The May 2025 elections are unlikely to bring significant change. In the current 19^th Congress, over half (142) of the District representatives seeking re-election belong to political dynasties. At least 71 of the country’s 82 provincial governments (87%) are led by members of political dynasties^[1].  Forty-seven of the 71 incumbent governors belonging to political dynasties are seeking re-election.  At the same time, 19 sitting governors who are not running for re-election have family members seeking to replace them^[2].

This dominance underscores a system where power is frequently passed down within families, raising concerns about its impact on democratic representation and political diversity. In addition to the Marcos-Romauldez clans of Ilocos Norte and Leyte there are about two dozen political dynasties seeking to occupy at least five seats each after the May 2025 elections. 

Among them are the; Singsons of Ilocos Sur; Hataman-Sallimans of Basilan; Ortegas of La Union, Dys of Isabela; Tulfos, Pacquiaos of South Cotabato and Sarangani; Dutertes of Davao City; Villar family of Las Piñas; Abaloses of Mandaluyong; Revillas and Tolentinos of Cavite; Ejercitos of Laguna and San Juan City; Khos of Masbate; Ynareses of Rizal; Khonghuns of Zambales; Duranos of Cebu; Dimaporos of Lanao Del Norte; Alonto-Adiongs of Lanao Del Sur; Ampatuans and Masturas of Maguindanao; and Tans of Sulu^[3].

To bypass legislative restrictions on terms in office, members of the same clan often substitute a relative or advance to a higher position. At least 67 outgoing district representatives have opted to switch positions with family members, ensuring their political influence remains intact.^[4] In Las Piñas City, Sen. Cynthia Villar and her daughter, Rep. Camille Villar, are swapping places, with the former sliding back to run as a congresswoman and the latter gunning for a Senate seat^[5]. The current Sen. Villar is reaching her term limit in the Senate this year.^[6]  

In the Senate, Cynthia Villiar and her son, Mark A Villar, are one of three family tandems in the Senate. The others are the siblings Alan Peter Cayetano and Pia Cayetano, half-brothers Jinggoy Ejercito and Joseph Victor G. Ejercito.  Both brothers of Senator Raffy Tulfo are running to join him in the Senate in 2025 so it could result in 4 family sets that when combined would control almost 40% of the Senate seats. 

Party-list System Hijacked by Political Dynasties

The Party list system, originally conceived in 1987 after the EDSA People Power uprising, was embedded in the Philippine constitution as a means of giving voice to marginalized and disadvantaged groups. This system has been increasingly corrupted by political dynasties. Research by the PCIJ showed that 36 of the 54 party-list groups (66%) in the current 19th Congress have at least one nominee belonging to a political family.^[7]

In the May 2025 elections, at least 78 out of the 156 party-list organizations certified by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) belong to political families.^[8] Speaker Romualdez (of the Marcos-Romualdez clan), who is seeking re-election as Leyte’s 1st District representative for the sixth time, is introducing his son Andrew to politics through the party-list system. The younger Romualdez is set to replace his mother Yedda as first nominee for the Tingog party-list group^[9]. The flawed party-list system has been criticized as a “backdoor” to the House for political dynasties and big businesses.^[10]

There has been a proliferation of regional party list groups that are led by members of political dynasties.  In the Visayas, Abag-Promdi is represented by Mariano Mimo Osmeña, son of the late Cebu Gov. Lito Osmeña^[11]. Barkadahan Para Sa Bansa party-list group is fielding a member of the notorious Durano political clan, also of Cebu province. Danao City Mayor Thomas Durano is the nephew of former Danao Mayor Ramon Durano Jr.^[12]

When it comes to local governments, at least 113 out of 149 city mayors (75%) belong to political dynasties. Out of 149 city mayors, 56 have relatives as either their vice-mayors or councilors. In the 2025 elections, a total of 80, or about 53% of all city mayors, are from dynasties seeking re-election. Meanwhile, 27 sitting city mayors are considering relatives to replace them as most of them run for other positions^[13].  

Political dynasties are inherent in a society marked by high inequality and poverty, which stem from the historical concentration of land and wealth ownership in the hands of a few. It is almost impossible to compete for political office without significant wealth, limiting successful candidates to those born in families of economic and political elites. This is true even in the local elections. According to data from IBON Foundation, the average spending per candidate for the elective positions in 2022 are as follows: President (P3 billion), Vice President (P1 billion), Senator (P350 million), Congress (P15 million), Governor (P15 million), Vice Governor (P7.5 million), Board Member (P1 million), Mayor (P3 million), Vice Mayor (P1.5 million), and Councilor (P100,000). Compare this to the average across-the-country minimum wage of P470, and it is clear that running for public office is an affair of the ruling elite.

The dynastic concentration of political power has become more pronounced over the past 20 years. By 2025, approximately 80% of provincial governors belong to “fat dynasties“^[14], up from 57% in 2004. Similarly, dynastic representation in the House of Representatives has risen to 67% from 48% in 2004, and mayoral posts held by dynasties increased to 53% from 40%. In the 2022 Senate elections, at least 12.5% (3) leading candidates had relatives already in the 24 -seat chamber. Notably, 4.5% (800 out of 18,000) positions contested had single candidates from warlord political clans against whom no one dared to contest.^[15]

There is a correlation between dynastic concentration and poverty. A 2015 study released by the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) noted “Dynasties are pervasive in the 10 poorest provinces that are afflicted by low levels of human development, bad governance, violence and poor business climates,”^[16]Apart from a direct link to poverty incidence, political dynasties also tend to undermine democratic processes by weakening the checks and balances in the government and the political system. Essentially, the historic feudal and social and economic system have created a trajectory whereby the political system becomes less and less democratic with each electoral cycle. 

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^[1] https://pcij.org/2024/12/08/governors-political-dynasties-philippines-provinces-elections/

^[2] https://pcij.org/2024/12/08/governors-political-dynasties-philippines-provinces-elections/

^[3] https://pcij.org/2024/10/25/fat-political-dynasties-philippines-elections/

^[4] https://pcij.org/2024/10/26/lower-house-district-representatives-political-dynasties-reelection/

^[5] https://pcij.org/2024/10/26/lower-house-district-representatives-political-dynasties-reelection/

^[6] https://kodao.org/5-ways-philippine-dynasties-are-able-to-stay-in-power/

^[7] https://pcij.org/2024/12/04/political-dynasties-also-swarm-the-party-list-elections/

^[8] In the May 2025 elections, at least 78 out of the 156 party-list organizations certified by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) also belong to political families.

^[9] https://kodao.org/5-ways-philippine-dynasties-are-able-to-stay-in-power/

^[10] https://kodao.org/5-ways-philippine-dynasties-are-able-to-stay-in-power/

^[11] https://pcij.org/2024/12/04/political-dynasties-also-swarm-the-party-list-elections/

^[12]https://pcij.org/2024/12/04/political-dynasties-also-swarm-the-party-list-elections/

^[13] https://pcij.org/2025/01/26/113-out-of-149-philippine-cities-also-ruled-by-political-dynasties/

^[14] There are two types of political dynasties, thin and fat, according to the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. A thin dynasty is one in which a political clan is able to manipulate one elected position over time. A fat dynasty is one in which a political clan holds multiple government positions simultaneously. According to Prof. Ronald Mendoza, “The more fat dynasties you have, the more poverty there’s likely to be.” 

^[15] After Duterte: clan politics and US influence in the Philippines, /morningstaronline.co.uk, 19 March 2025.

^[16] https://businessmirror.com.ph/2015/08/20/pervasive-political-dynasty-worsened-poverty-in-phl/

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ICHRP is conducting an International Observer Mission in 2025 to monitor for elections-related human rights violations. Learn more at https://www.ichrp.net/IOM2025